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I
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    n early 2018, the media began to report that the United States was debat-
ing whether to “react to some nuclear or missile test with a targeted strike 
against a North Korean facility to bloody Pyongyang’s nose and illustrate the 
high price the regime could pay for its behavior.”1 This article asks a simple 
question: would such a “bloody nose strike” (BNS) violate international law’s 
rules on the use of force, the jus ad bellum? 
Unfortunately, providing a coherent answer is complicated by the lack 
of clarity surrounding the United States’ planning of such a strike. In partic-
ular, the government has not specified what kind of provocation it would 
consider sufficient to justify a BNS, has not identified precisely what a BNS 
would entail, and has not offered a legal theory for why a BNS would be 
permissible under international law. To some extent, therefore, this article is 
inherently speculative. 
Because so much is unknown, the following legal analysis proceeds on 
two assumptions. The first is that the United States would attempt to justify 
a BNS either as the collective self-defense of Japan, its ally most directly 
threatened by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, or on the basis of its 
own individual right of self-defense. The second is that a BNS would be a 
response to one of two North Korean provocations that have taken place 
over the past couple of years: (1) a test of nuclear weapon on North Korean 
territory, or (2) the intentional launch of an unarmed ballistic missile into 
Japan’s territorial waters.2 
The article itself is divided into four parts. Part II asks whether either 
North Korean provocation would qualify as an “armed attack,” the neces-
sary precondition of individual or collective self-defense. Part III analyzes 
what would be required for the United States to justify a BNS as the collec-
tive self-defense of Japan. And Part IV discusses whether the United States 
                                                                                                                      
1. Gerald F. Seib, Amid Signs of a Thaw in North Korea, Tensions Bubble Up, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-signs-of-a-thaw-in-north-
korea-tensions-bubble-up-1515427541. 
2. See Michael Schmitt & Ryan Goodman, Best Advice for Policymakers on “Bloody Nose” 
Strike against North Korea: It’s Illegal, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.justsecurity. 
org/51320/advice-policymakers-bloody-nose-strike-north-korea-illegal/. North Korea has 
also fired multiple unarmed missiles through Japan’s airspace. Because there is no relevant 
difference between such launches and launching an armed missile into Japan’s territorial 
waters (which necessarily involves invading Japan’s airspace), I will address only the latter 
type of launch. 
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could justify a BNS as its own individual self-defense. Throughout this anal-
ysis, the article assumes that there are no relevant differences between con-
ventional and customary international law concerning the use of force.3 
 
II. ARMED ATTACK 
 
In order for the United States to invoke either collective or individual self-
defense, a BNS would have to be a response to an armed attack (or what is 
believed to be an armed attack) by North Korea. To constitute an armed 
attack, one of the North Korean provocations would have to qualify as (1) a 
use of force that is (2) particularly grave. 
 
A. Use of Force 
 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”4 Because a use of 
force must have an interstate element,5 a nuclear test on North Korean ter-
ritory would not represent a use of force within the meaning of Article 
2(4)—and thus could not justify self-defense under Article 51.6 
That does not mean, however, that such tests are lawful. To begin with, 
as I have explained elsewhere,7 the ratification of the Comprehensive Nu-
clear-Test-Ban Treaty8 by 168 States,9 including by the vast majority of States 
                                                                                                                      
3. See, e.g., Oliver Dörr, Prohibition of Use of Force, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 10 (Sept. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10. 
1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e427 (“It is submitted . . . that the pro-
hibition of the use of force is today both a norm of treaty law and of international customary 
law and that both rules are, at least in general, identical in content.”). 
4. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
5. See Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 21 (“Art. 2 (4) UN Charter prohibits the use of force solely 
in the international relations between States. It does not, therefore, apply to the use of mil-
itary force within the territory of a State . . . .”). 
6. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
7. Kevin Jon Heller, Specially-Affected States and the Formation of Custom, 112 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (2018). 
8. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1439 (1996) (not yet in force). 
9. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-
4&chapter=26&clang=_en (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that can be considered specially affected with regard to nuclear weapons, 
means that customary international law likely prohibits all nuclear testing, 
regardless of location.10 
It is also possible that North Korea’s nuclear testing runs afoul of Article 
2(4)’s prohibition on the threat of force. The question here, following the 
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons advisory opinion, is why North Korea engages in such testing: 
 
In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of unlawful attack, States sometimes 
signal that they possess certain weapons to use in self-defence against any 
State violating their territorial integrity or political independence. Whether 
a signalled intention to use force if certain events occur is or is not a 
“threat” within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter depends upon various 
factors. If the envisaged use of force is itself unlawful, the stated readiness 
to use it would be a threat prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4. Thus it 
would be illegal for a State to threaten force to secure territory from an-
other State, or to cause it to follow or not follow certain political or eco-
nomic paths.11 
 
North Korea clearly views its nuclear arsenal as a way of deterring States, 
particularly the United States, from attacking it.12 But experts agree that 
North Korea also uses nuclear testing to coerce States like South Korea and 
Japan to adopt political and economic policies that are friendlier—or at least 
less hostile—to it.13 The latter purpose likely renders the testing an unlawful 
threat of force. 
A strong case can be made, then, that North Korea’s nuclear testing, 
despite taking place on its territory, is a wrongful act that gives rise to its 
international responsibility.14 As a result, injured States—at a minimum those 
                                                                                                                      
10. It is possible, of course, that North Korea should be considered a persistent objec-
tor to that prohibition. See Heller, supra note 7, at 240. 
11. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶ 47  (July 8); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 269 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua] (noting 
that “in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the 
State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State 
can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception”). 
12. STEPHEN BLANK, A WAY OUT OF THE NORTH KOREAN LABYRINTH 3 (2014). 
13. Id. 
14. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION pt. 2, 32, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). 
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specially affected by the nuclear testing, whether because they suffer the en-
vironmental impact of the testing or are the targets of the coercion it repre-
sents15—are entitled not only to demand that North Korea cease testing,16 
but also to engage in countermeasures designed to induce North Korea to 
comply with its international obligations.17 
The right to engage in countermeasures, however, would not justify a 
U.S. BNS against North Korea, whether as an act of collective or individual 
self-defense. Article 50 of the Articles on State Responsibility make clear that 
“[c]ountermeasures shall not affect . . . the obligation to refrain from the 
threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”18 
Indeed, given the analysis below,19 a BNS in response to a nuclear test on 
North Korean territory would itself qualify as an armed attack, entitling North 
Korea to use force against the United States in self-defense. 
The use of force analysis is very different for the launch of an unarmed 
missile into Japan’s territorial waters. The critical issue here, given that such 
a launch necessarily affects Japan’s territorial integrity, is whether Article 2(4) 
implicitly contains a gravity requirement that might not be satisfied by the 
launch of a single unarmed missile into an area devoid of people and objects. 
There is some support for a gravity requirement in the legal scholarship and 
in the practice of international organizations. Corten, for example, has ar-
gued that “there is a threshold below which the use of force in international 
relations, while it may be contrary to certain rules of international law, cannot 
violate article 2(4).”20 Similarly, the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia has claimed that Article 2(4) excludes 
incidents such as “the targeted killing of single individuals, forcible abduc-
tions of individual persons, or the interception of a single aircraft,” because 
the “prohibition of the use of force covers all physical force which surpasses 
a minimum threshold of intensity.”21 
                                                                                                                      
15. Id. art. 42(b)(i). 
16. Id. art. 30. 
17. Id. art. 49. 
18. Id. art. 50(1)(a). 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 39–52. 
20. OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR 55, 77 (2010); see also Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, The Prohibition on the Use of Force, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 89, 102 (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson eds., 2013) 
(“Article 2(4) is narrower than it might appear on its face. Minimal or de minimis uses of force 
are likely to fall below the threshold of the Article 2(4) prohibition.”). 
21. 2 REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON 
THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA 242, 242 n.49 (2009). 
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The idea that Article 2(4) implicitly contains a gravity requirement, how-
ever, is difficult to reconcile with the provision’s travaux préparatoires, which 
indicate that it was intended to be “an absolute all-inclusive prohibition.”22 
Moreover, as Ruys has shown, States have routinely invoked Article 2(4) in 
response both to limited military confrontations between States23 and to 
small-scale military incursions that did not meet with armed resistance.24 In 
the latter situation, the critical factor determining international reaction has 
been the presence or absence of hostile intent. States have generally refrained 
from invoking Article 2(4) when an incursion was either accidental, such as 
soldiers unknowingly crossing an international border, or intentional but not 
intended to harm the territorial State, such as an aircraft crossing an interna-
tional border to avoid bad weather.25 By contrast, they have been quick to 
invoke Article 2(4) whenever an incursion was deliberate and in any way 
threatening—even in situations involving a single aircraft or a single ship.26 
The best interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force is thus the 
one offered by Dörr: 
 
In relation to small-scale intrusions of a military character it is decisive to 
determine whether they reflect a hostile intent on the part of the intruder. 
Other than that, no specific gravity threshold can be read into Article 2(4) 
UN Charter nor be shown to exist in the customary practice of States.27 
 
By this standard, North Korea firing an unarmed missile into Japan’s terri-
torial waters would qualify as a use of force as long as North Korea intended 
                                                                                                                      
22. 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATION 334–35 (1945). 
23. See Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are 
“Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded From UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 159, 183–87 (2014). 
24. See id. at 189–90. 
25. See, e.g., “Force Majeure” and “Fortuitous Event” as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: 
Survey of State Practice, International Judicial Decisions and Doctrine – Study Prepared by the Secretariat, 
[1978] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, pt. 1, 61, 99–104, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A 1978/Add.l (Part 1). 
26. Ruys, supra note 23, at 189. 
27. Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 19; see also Ruys, supra note 23, at 189 (“[A]n unlawful territorial 
incursion, even if small in scale, that reflects a manifest hostile intent may come within the 
ambit of Article 2(4), irrespective of whether the territorial state choses to respond by 
force.”). 
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the missile to breach Japan’s territorial sovereignty, as has been the case for 
all previous launches through Japan’s airspace.28 
There is, however, one lingering question: Is firing an unarmed missile 
into a depopulated area an act “of a military character”? Or is it closer to 
political or economic coercion, which both the context29 and drafting his-
tory30 of Article 2(4) indicate are excluded from the prohibition of the use of 
force?31 Schmitt and Goodman seem to take the latter position when they 
argue that an unarmed missile does not qualify as a weapon when fired into 
an area devoid of people or objects.32 Their argument implies that such an 
act would not qualify as a use of military force under Article 2(4) even if the 
necessary hostile intent is present.33 
I disagree, as it seems clear from State practice that “military character” 
refers to the nature of the actor using force, not the act itself. In other words, 
an act has a military character when a State’s armed forces engage in the act, 
regardless of the specific form the act takes. To be sure, Dörr persuasively 
argues that it is possible to imagine an extraterritorial act involving a State’s 
armed forces that would violate the principle of non-intervention but not 
the prohibition on the use of force, such as unarmed soldiers delivering hu-
manitarian assistance to civilians without the territorial State’s consent.34 
Such acts are excluded from Article 2(4), however, not because they do not 
have a military character, but because they lack hostile intent. An unarmed 
missile deliberately fired by North Korea’s armed forces into Japan’s territo-
rial waters would thus clearly be an act of a military character, even if the 
missile was unarmed and not a “weapon” as that term is usually understood. 
                                                                                                                      
28. North Korea has never claimed that any of the breaches of Japan’s airspace were 
accidental. 
29. See, e.g., Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 11 
Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of the UN Charter identifies as one of the goals of the United 
Nations ‘to ensure . . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’, and 
Art. 44 shows that the UN Charter uses the term ‘force’ where it refers to the application 
of military force. 
30. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in 
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL. LAW 885, 905 (1999) (noting that States refused to adopt proposals to 
include political and economic coercion within Article 2(4)). 
31. See, e.g., Ruys, supra note 23, at 163 (“It is generally accepted that [Article 2(4)] ex-
tends to armed force only.”). 
32. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2. 
33. Id. 
34. Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 19. 
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The growing acceptance of the idea that cyberattacks can violate Article 
2(4) supports this conclusion. Cyberattacks involve neither “armed” force, 
in the literal sense of the term, nor even kinetic force, which is why both 
States and scholars were originally skeptical that they qualify as uses of force 
under Article 2(4).35 The more modern position, however, is that a cyberat-
tack “specifically intended to directly cause physical damage to tangible prop-
erty or injury or death to human beings is reasonably characterized as a use 
of armed force and, therefore, encompassed in the prohibition.”36 As with 
the unarmed missile, the determinative factor is hostile intent, not the extent 
of the tangible damage caused by the cyberattack. 
 
B. Grave Use 
 
The more difficult question is whether North Korea launching an unarmed 
missile into Japan’s territorial waters qualifies not only as a use of force, but 
also as an “armed attack” on Japan. Reeves and Lawless say yes;37 Schmitt 
and Goodman say no.38 Schmitt and Goodman have the stronger argument. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
35. See, e.g., William C. Banks & Evan J. Criddle, Customary Constraints on the Use of Force: 
Article 51 with an American Accent, 29 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67, 88 
(2016) (“The traditional and dominant view is that the prohibition on the use of force and 
right of self-defence apply to armed violence, and only to interventions that produce phys-
ical damage. Under the traditional standard, most cyber-attacks will not violate Article 2(4), 
and thus do not enable Article 51 self-defence.”). 
36. Schmitt, supra note 30, at 913; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND 
SELF-DEFENCE 88 (5th ed. 2011) (“[T]he term ‘force’ in Article 2(4) must denote violence. 
It does not matter what specific means – kinetic or electronic – are used to bring it about, 
but the end result must be that violence occurs or is threatened.”); Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 12 
(“[C]omputer network attacks intended to directly cause physical damage to property or 
injury to human beings in another State may reasonably be considered armed force.”). 
37. Shane Reeves & Robert Lawless, Is There an International Legal Basis for the ‘Bloody 
Nose’ Strategy?, LAWFARE (Jan.19, 2018),  https://www.lawfareblog.com/there-interna-
tional-legal-basis-bloody-nose-strategy (“[A]nother North Korean test in which it launches 
an unarmed missile into Japanese sovereign territory . . . could reasonably be interpreted as 
an armed attack.”). 
38. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2 
[I]f intentionally launched with the foreseeable result that the missile would land in a pop-
ulated area and harm individuals or property with a significant scale and effect, then the 
operation might qualify as an armed attack regardless of whether it carried a warhead. But 
that is not the case here. 
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1. Is There a Gravity Threshold? 
 
There are two interrelated issues here. The first is whether all uses of force 
qualify as armed attacks. The United States itself—to quote Harold Koh dur-
ing his tenure as the Legal Advisor to the State Department—“has for a long 
time taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially ap-
plies against any illegal use of force. In our view, there is no threshold for a 
use of deadly force to qualify as an ‘armed attack’ that may warrant a forcible 
response.”39 Some scholars agree.40 
For multiple reasons, however, that position is difficult to defend. To 
begin with, as Ruys points out, “the different wording used in Article 2(4) 
UN Charter and Article 51 strongly suggests that ‘armed attack’ has a nar-
rower scope than ‘use of force.’”41 That implication, in turn, is supported by 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314, which specifically adopts a gravity-
based distinction between the use of force and aggression in two contexts: 
Security Council determinations that aggression has not taken place42 and 
indirect aggression.43 Moreover, “throughout the negotiations, numerous 
countries stressed that only the ‘most serious’ uses of force qualified as 
‘armed attacks’” for self-defense in general.44 Indeed, State practice generally 
reflects that there is a gap between “mere” uses of force and armed attacks, 
even if States do not want to set the armed attack threshold too high.45 
The ICJ has also consistently emphasized that not all uses of force qual-
ify as armed attacks. In Nicaragua, the court famously opined that only “the 
most grave forms of the use of force” qualify as armed attacks.46 The Court 
reaffirmed that distinction in Oil Platforms, holding that the Iranian incidents 
                                                                                                                      
39. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 
18, 2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm. 
40. See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
HOW WE USE IT 251 (1994). 
41. TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: 
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 148 (2013). 
42. G.A. Res. 3314, annex, art. 2, Definition of Aggression (Dec. 14, 1974). 
43. Id. art. 3(g) (deeming an act of aggression “[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State 
of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above”). 
44. RUYS, supra note 41, at 150. 
45. Id. at 155. 
46. Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 191. 
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in question, even if viewed cumulatively, did not amount to a “most grave” 
use of force and thus could not be considered an armed attack.47 
 
2. Distinguishing “Mere” Uses of Force 
 
The critical issue regarding the definition of an armed attack, therefore, is 
the nature of the distinction between “ordinary” and “most grave” uses of 
force, not whether such a distinction exists. The distinction cannot turn on 
whether the use of force in question was accompanied by hostile intent, be-
cause we have seen that the presence or absence of such intent is what de-
termines whether a small-scale territorial incursion qualifies as a use of force 
in the first place. Instead, the distinction is based on the “scale and effects” 
of the hostile use of force, the factor the ICJ emphasized in Nicaragua.48 
Whereas any deliberate military incursion into another State’s territory 
qualifies as a use of force, even one that causes no harm, only a deliberate 
military incursion that is at least capable of causing harm to people or property 
qualifies as an armed attack.49 An armed attack has thus taken place either 
when a hostile use of force actually causes such harm50 or at least would have 
caused such harm had the attack succeeded as planned. The former situation 
is obvious; the latter is illustrated by two unsuccessful operations cited by 
                                                                                                                      
47. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov. 6) [herein-
after Oil Platforms]. 
48. Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 195 (distinguishing between “a mere frontier incident” 
and an armed attack). 
49. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 36, at 195 (defining an armed attack as “a use of force 
producing (or liable to produce) serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions, 
human casualties or considerable destruction of property”); RUYS, supra note 41, at 155 
(“[C]ustomary practice suggests that, subject to the necessity and proportionality criteria, 
even small-scale bombings, artillery, naval or aerial attacks qualify as ‘armed attacks’ activat-
ing Article 51 UN Charter, as long as they result in, or are capable of resulting in destruction 
of property or loss of lives.”). 
50. See, e.g., Karl Zemanek, Armed Attack, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 10 (Oct. 2013), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law: 
epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e241 
In sum, it is submitted that regardless of the dispute over degrees in the use of force, or 
over the quantifiability of victims and damage, or over harmful intentions, an armed attack 
even when it consists of a single incident, which leads to a considerable loss of life and 
extensive destruction of property, is of sufficient gravity to be considered an ‘armed attack’ 
in the sense of Art. 51 UN Charter. 
RUYS, supra note 41, at 152 (“When a State’s territory or its external manifestations abroad 
become the target of artillery shelling, air strikes, bombings and the like, there is in principle 
little doubt that such attacks reach the necessary gravity to qualify as ‘armed attacks.’”). 
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Ruys in which the international community nevertheless implicitly accepted 
that the State using force had engaged in an armed attack: Iraq’s intercepted 
attempt to assassinate President Bush in Kuwait in April 1993, and Yemen’s 
attack on Harib Fort in 1964, which killed only a few camels.51 
Given this understanding of gravity, it is clear that North Korea deliber-
ately launching an unarmed missile into Japanese territorial waters would not 
qualify as an armed attack against Japan. As Schmitt and Goodman note, “if 
intentionally launched with the foreseeable result that the missile would land 
in a populated area and harm individuals or property with a significant scale 
and effect, then the operation might qualify as an armed attack regardless of 
whether it carried a warhead.”52 Deliberately launching an unarmed missile 
into the sea (or through airspace), however, is not capable of causing harm 
to people or property. It is thus no more than a prohibited use of force. 
 
3. Accumulation of Events 
 
Although that conclusion is sound, it does not end the analysis of whether 
North Korea would commit an armed attack against Japan if it fired another 
unarmed missile into Japan’s territorial waters. One use of force might not 
be enough to qualify as an armed attack, but what about a series of them? 
After all, North Korea has launched multiple missiles into Japan’s territorial 
waters or through its airspace in the past few years alone. 
This possibility implicates the so-called “accumulation of events” doc-
trine, one version of which53 holds that “a number of incidents emanating 
from the same source and within a similar timeframe, which alone might not 
have met the threshold for an armed attack, might be considered in combi-
nation as an armed attack.”54 The ICJ has implicitly endorsed the accumula-
tion of events doctrine, at least in principle, in three cases: Nicaragua,55 Oil 
                                                                                                                      
51. See RUYS, supra note 41, at 153. 
52. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2. 
53. A second form, relevant to the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense, is dis-
cussed below. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
54. COMMITTEE ON THE USE OF FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL 
REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE 7 (2018) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT ON 
AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE]. 
55. Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 231 (asking whether a series of incursions into the terri-
tories of Honduras and Costa Rica could be treated “as amounting, singly or collectively, to 
an armed attack”). 
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Platforms,56 and Armed Activities.57 Moreover, States have often invoked the 
doctrine to justify their self-defensive acts without encountering significant 
resistance from the international community.58 
Although he does not explicitly invoke the accumulation of events doc-
trine, Dunlap suggests that it is defensible to view each of North Korea’s 
missile launches as part of an “extended attack operation” on Japan: 
 
To me, the context matters: a single, isolated launch of a missile that’s 
somehow known to be unarmed is one thing, but a pattern of launches 
from a rogue regime issuing repeated threats about nuclear attacks is some-
thing quite different. . . . It’s a fairly standard military tactic to induce com-
placency in your opponent by employing ruses and feints as a part of an 
extended attack operation. (This is especially so in Soviet military the-
ory which still seems to dominate North Korean thinking.) Let’s ask our-
selves, can we really be sure that we’re not we witnessing something like 
that with the North Koreans? Are these repeated launches of “unarmed” 
missiles part of a sophisticated North Korean operation (already under-
way?) which is intended to lull the U.S. and its allies into thinking the mis-
sile launches are merely harmless “tests”?59 
 
By contrast, Schmitt and Goodman dismiss any attempt to rely on the accu-
mulation of events doctrine in the North Korean context, arguing that “un-
less it could be reasonably concluded that subsequent missile tests would be 
conducted and that a forceful response would be necessary to stop them,” 
such tests could not “be treated as one in a series of actions that constitute 
an on-going campaign that in its entirety constitutes an armed attack.”60 
Schmitt and Goodman’s position is more persuasive. Although the ac-
cumulation of events doctrine is designed to permit a defensive response to 
a “continuous, overall plan of attack purposely relying on numerous small 
                                                                                                                      
56. Oil Platforms, supra note 47, ¶ 64 (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the idea that 
the Iranian attack in question “either in itself or in combination with the rest of the ‘series . 
. . of attacks’ . . . can be categorized as an ‘armed attack’ on the United States”). 
57. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities] (“[E]ven if this 
series of deplorable attacks could be regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained 
non-attributable to the DRC.”). 
58. RUYS, supra note 41, at 172. 
59. Charlie Dunlap, The “Bloody Nose” Strategy Debate: Why It’s More Complicated than Some 
Think, LAWFIRE (Jan. 24, 2018), https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2018/01/24/the-bloody-
nose-strategy-debate-why-its-more-complicated-than-some-think/. 
60. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2. 
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raids”61—generally similar to Dunlap’s characterization of the missile 
launches—the doctrine “does not relieve the defending State of its duty to 
demonstrate that it has actually been the victim of the use of armed force.”62 
There is simply no evidence that North Korea’s unarmed missile launches 
have been part of an “extended attack operation” designed to make a harm-
ful launch possible by lulling Japan and the United States into a false sense 
of security. 
Dunlap’s interpretation might be plausible if Japan had stopped shooting 
down North Korean missiles once they realized they were unarmed. But Ja-
pan has never tried to intercept one of the missiles, despite having the wea-
ponry necessary to do so,63 which means that North Korea has always been 
free to successfully fire an armed missile at Japan. Indeed, Dunlap acknowl-
edges that North Korea could attack Japan even without aiming directly at 
the Japanese mainland, because a nuclear weapon would likely cause signifi-
cant damage if detonated over Japan’s territorial waters.64 That possibility 
undermines any claim that the missile launches are somehow part of a “con-
tinuous, overall plan of attack” that would justify a defensive response. In-
stead, they are best understood as discrete uses of force that do not qualify 
as armed attacks either individually or collectively. 
 
4. Knowledge 
 
The armed attack analysis conducted above, however, assumes that Japan 
knows North Korea’s missiles are unarmed. An armed missile fired into Ja-
pan’s territorial waters would obviously qualify as an armed attack, thus en-
                                                                                                                      
61. Barry Levenfeld, Israel’s Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal 
Under Modern International Law, 21 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 7 n.18 
(1982). 
62. RUYS, supra note 41, at 174. The ICJ emphasized the lack of evidence for the United 
States accumulation of events claim in the Nicaragua case. See Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 231 
(“Very little information is available to the Court as to the circumstances of these incursions 
or their possible motivations, which renders it difficult to decide whether they may be 
treated for legal purposes as amounting, singly or collectively, to an armed attack by Nica-
ragua on either or both States.”). 
63. Alex Lockie, Japan May Have No Choice but to Shoot Down the Next North Korean Missile 
Test, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.nl/japan-us-shoot-
down-next-north-korean-missile-test-2017-8?international=true&r=U.S.. 
64. Dunlap, supra note 59 (“If even one ‘test’ missile turned out to be the real thing, 
how much damage could it do if it exploded not on Japan’s mainland but only over its 
territorial sea? Maybe a lot.”). 
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titling Japan to shoot down the missile in self-defense. Although the bound-
aries of interceptive self-defense are blurry, it is “uncontested” that, at a min-
imum, it permits intercepting a weapon that is not under the control of a 
human being, such as a missile.65 
To date, Japan has assumed that each of the missiles North Korea has 
launched through its airspace or into its territorial waters has been unarmed. 
But what if it believed—as opposed to knew—that a particular missile was 
armed? Would that belief entitle Japan to act in self-defense (and thus the 
United States to act in collective self-defense, as discussed below)? 
This is a difficult question, but the better answer is that it would. As Ruys 
states, “[a]t the strategic level, the distinction between (admissible) intercep-
tive and (inadmissible) pre-emptive self-defence is determined by and large 
by the irreversibility of the opponent’s conduct.”66 In the context of a fron-
tier incident, the invaded State will normally be able to delay a response until 
it has taken steps to determine whether the invading State is acting with hos-
tile intent. That will not be the case, however, with a missile that has already 
been launched and may be armed. In that situation, not taking immediate 
steps to intercept the missile could have catastrophic consequences. The ter-
ritorial State should thus be entitled to assume that the missile constitutes an 
armed attack and defend itself accordingly. 
 
III. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
 
Unless the United States acted in response to an armed attack on its interests, 
a BNS on North Korea would have to be justified as the collective self-de-
fense of Japan. Such a collective self-defense claim raises two issues: (1) a 
procedural issue concerning whether Japan would have to specifically re-
quest the United States to defend it; and (2) a substantive issue concerning 
the scope of the permissible response. 
 
A. Procedure 
 
Any discussion of collective self-defense in the form of a BNS assumes that 
one of North Korea’s missile launches qualifies as an armed attack on Japan. 
                                                                                                                      
65. RUYS, supra note 41, at 347. 
66. Id. at 356. 
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If a State is not entitled to act in individual self-defense, collective self-de-
fense of that State is unlawful.67 As we have seen, although an unarmed mis-
sile fired into Japan’s territorial waters does not objectively qualify as an 
armed attack, Japan would be entitled to assume that it was being attacked if 
it believed a missile was armed. In such a situation, Japan would be fully 
entitled to request the United States come to its defense. Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter specifically endorses collective self-defense, and there is no re-
quirement in international law that a State engaging in collective self-defense 
has its own individual right of self-defense.68 
But what if, in response to an armed attack, Japan did not ask for U.S. 
assistance? Or what if Japan explicitly rejected it? Would the United States 
still be entitled to act in the “collective self-defense” of Japan? 
Under customary international law, it is clear that collective self-defense 
is permissible only when the attacked State expressly requests assistance. The 
ICJ made that requirement clear in Nicaragua: 
 
At all events, the Court finds that in customary international law, whether 
of a general kind or that particular to the inter-American legal system, there 
is no rule permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence 
of a request by the State which regards itself as the victim of an armed 
attack. The Court concludes that the requirement of a request by the State 
which is the victim of the alleged attack is additional to the requirement 
that such a State should have declared itself to have been attacked.69 
 
The ICJ reaffirmed the requirement of an express request both in Oil Plat-
forms70 and (slightly more obliquely) in Armed Activities.71 
                                                                                                                      
67. See, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 156 (4th 
ed. 2018). 
68. See, e.g., George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What 
the Treaties Have Said, 72 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 365, 383 (1998) (“Although it has 
been argued that an assisting State must have substantive rights or interests affected by an 
attacking State’s action, or that an assisting State must have an individual right of self-de-
fense, neither is a prerequisite for coming to the aid of a target State.”). 
69. Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 199. 
70. Oil Platforms, supra note 47, ¶ 51 (“Despite having referred to attacks on vessels and 
aircraft of other nationalities, the United States has not claimed to have been exercising collective 
self-defence on behalf of neutral States engaged in shipping in the Persian Gulf; this would have 
required the existence of a request made to the United States ‘by the state which regards itself as 
the victim of an armed attack.’”). 
71. Armed Activities, supra note 57, ¶ 128 (“Article 51 of the Charter refers to the right 
of ‘individual or collective’ self-defence. The Court notes that a State may invite another 
State to assist it in using force in self-defence.”). 
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State practice also overwhelmingly supports the express-request require-
ment, from Jordan and Lebanon’s requests for help against the United Arab 
Republic in 1958 to Iraq’s much more recent request for help against the 
Islamic State. Indeed, as Gray has pointed out, “in every case where a third 
state has invoked collective self-defence it has based its claim on the request 
of the victim state, even where there was no express treaty provision requir-
ing this.”72  
It is also worth noting that both the United States and Japan accept the 
requirement of an express request. According to the U.S. Army’s Operational 
Law Handbook, “[t]o constitute a legitimate act of collective self-defense, all 
conditions for the exercise of an individual State’s right of self-defense must 
be met, along with the additional requirement that assistance must be re-
quested by the victim State.”73 Japan has consistently taken this position.74 
A number of scholars have argued, however, that the customary express-
request requirement is superseded by Article V of the 1960 Mutual Cooper-
ation Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America, which pro-
vides that “[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party 
in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to 
its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”75 Ac-
cording to Sari and Nasu, for example, Article V means that 
 
an armed attack on Japan would not only impose an obligation on the 
United States to adopt appropriate measures, but it would also confer upon 
it a right to take forcible action without the need for a specific Japanese 
request to this effect, even where Japan is prevented from taking action in 
its individual self-defense for domestic legal or political reasons.76 
 
                                                                                                                      
72. GRAY, supra note 67, at 187. 
73. INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 5 (18th ed. 2018) 
[hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK]. 
74. See, e.g., Masahiro Kurosaki, The ‘Bloody Nose’ Strategy, Self-Defense and International Law: 
A View from Japan, LAWFARE (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/bloody-nose-
strategy-self-defense-and-international-law-view-japan. 
75. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan 
art. V, 11 U.S.T. 1632 (Jan. 19, 1960) [hereinafter Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security]. 
76. Aurel Sari & Hitoshi Nasu, Collective Self-Defense and the “Bloody Nose Strategy”: Does it 
Take Two to Tango?, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 26, 2018),  https://www.justsecurity.org/51435/ 
collective-self-defense-bloody-nose-strategy-tango/. 
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Reeves and Lawless agree.77 
This interpretation of the Mutual Cooperation Treaty is untenable. To 
begin with, it is inconsistent with Article IV of the Treaty, which provides 
that “[t]he Parties will consult together . . . whenever the security of Japan or 
international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.”78 As Kurosaki 
has pointed out, the consultation requirement “remains applicable even in 
the case of U.S. collective self-defense” of Japan.79 Moreover, Article VII of 
the Treaty explicitly states that it “does not affect and shall not be interpreted 
as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the 
Charter of the United Nations”80—obligations that include the requirement 
of an express request for assistance.81 And finally, Kurosaki notes that “Ja-
pan’s consistent position has instead been that the treaty only authorizes the 
United States to use force in collective self-defense where Japan exercises its 
right of individual self-defense in consultation with the United States.”82 In-
deed, Japan has taken that position specifically with regard to North Korea’s 
missile launches.83 
 
B. Substance 
 
Even if we assume that Japan would be willing to ask the United States to 
help defend it against an armed North Korean missile, it is unclear whether 
the United States would be entitled to do so through a BNS. All States, in-
cluding the United States,84 accept that collective self-defense cannot exceed 
the permissible defensive response by the attacked State. What a State cannot 
do singly, States cannot do collectively. A BNS against North Korea would 
be lawful, therefore, only if Japan would be entitled to engage in the same 
kind of strike in response to an armed missile launch. 
                                                                                                                      
77. Reeves & Lawless, supra note 37 (arguing that “[t]his treaty may provide a basis for 
the United States’ to engage in a limited retaliatory strike” even in the absence of an express 
Japanese request for assistance). 
78. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, supra note 75, art. IV. 
79. Kurosaki, supra note 74. 
80. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, supra note 75, art. IV. 
81. Kurosaki, supra note 74. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 5 (“To constitute a legitimate 
act of collective self-defense, all conditions for the exercise of an individual State’s right of 
self-defense must be met.”). 
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Because Japan would be entitled to engage in interceptive self-defense 
while an armed North Korean missile (or a missile reasonably believed to be 
armed) was in the air, there is no reason why it could not ask the United 
States to shoot the missile down for it. But that is not what the United States 
means by a BNS, which, by all accounts, would involve destroying a target 
on North Korean territory. Collective self-defense would justify that kind of 
strike only if Japan was entitled to use force against a North Korean target. 
Considering each North Korean missile launch separately, it is difficult 
to see how Japan could justify that kind of response. As Ruys notes, 
 
[i]t is generally accepted in customary practice and legal doctrine . . . that 
measures should be geared towards the halting or repelling of an armed 
attack and should not exceed this goal. Otherwise, the action undertaken 
will involve a punitive or retaliatory character and will be qualified as a re-
prisal, rather than as self-defence.85 
 
In media res, therefore, Japan would be entitled to intercept a missile, but not 
to strike the military installation in North Korea from which the missile was 
launched. The latter response would be retaliation, not prevention, and thus 
an illegal reprisal. 
The same limitation would not apply, however, if Japan had reason to 
believe that an intercepted (or completed) North Korean attack portended 
the imminent launch of subsequent armed attacks. In such a situation—
which is not the same as “true” anticipatory self-defense, where the State 
ostensibly defending itself has never been the victim of an armed attack86—
Japan would not only have the right to act pre-emptively,87 it would also be 
entitled to use whatever force was necessary to prevent the future attacks: 
                                                                                                                      
85. RUYS, supra note 41, at 94; see also GRAY, supra note 67, at 150 (noting that com-
mentators widely agree “self-defence must not be retaliatory or punitive; the aim should be 
to halt and repel an attack”). 
86. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 54, 
at 11; JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY 
STATES 165 (2004) (“Many commentators would argue that, when an armed attack has oc-
curred and there is the possibility of more such actions, anticipatory self-defence is not the 
issue.”). 
87. See, e.g., RUYS, supra note 41, at 106 (“In all, customary practice indicates that if a 
State has been subject not to an isolated attack, but to a series of armed attacks, and if there 
is a considerable likelihood that more attacks will imminently follow, then self-defence is 
not automatically excluded.”); Ashley S. Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 661, 663–64 (Marc 
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There is . . . significant support and practical reason to accept that the UN 
Charter should be read as accepting that self-defence measures may take 
into account the need to ensure that the attacker has not simply momen-
tarily refrained from operations while the attacks are in fact set to continue 
in the near future. It would appear therefore that while self-defence cannot 
justify “all-out” war to destroy the enemy, the forcible measures can in-
clude the need to defend the State from the continuation of attacks, and 
not only repel the attack of the moment.88 
 
Presumably, defending against “the continuation of attacks” by North 
Korea would require Japan to eliminate, or at least substantially degrade, 
North Korea’s ability to launch armed missiles at it. Japan could thus request 
the United States assist it in that endeavor as collective self-defense. 
The problem here, of course, is a factual one. To date, North Korea has 
not launched an armed attack against Japan, via missile or otherwise. That 
does not mean Japan could not attack a military installation in North Korea 
that was about to launch an armed missile, but Japan’s evidentiary burden89 
to prove an armed attack was imminent would be difficult to satisfy. A State 
that has never been the victim of an armed attack should be held to a higher 
standard of proof regarding imminence than a State that has already been 
attacked.90 At this point, Japan still faces the more significant evidentiary 
                                                                                                                      
Weller ed., 2015) (“To some extent, all uses of force in self-defence in response to a com-
pleted armed attack have an anticipatory element in them. That is, for force to be ‘necessary’, 
the victim state must anticipate that the attacker has the capacity and intent to strike again.”). 
88.  FINAL REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 54, at 11; see 
also Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 YEARBOOK OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION pt. 1, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN/SER.A/1980 
If . . . a State suffers a series of successive and different acts of armed attack from another 
State, the requirement of proportionality will certainly not mean that the victim State is not 
free to undertake a single armed action on a much larger scale in order to put an end to this 
escalating succession of attacks. 
GARDAM, supra note 86, at 161 (“[W]hen dealing with a series of attacks, the scale of the 
action taken to repulse such a series of attacks may differ from that which would be appro-
priate in response to an isolated armed attack.”). 
89. The State acting in self-defense always has the burden of proving the existence of 
an armed attack. See, e.g., Oil Platforms, supra note 47, ¶ 51. The standard of proof is unclear, 
but many scholars have endorsed a “clear and compelling evidence” requirement. See, e.g., 
RUYS, supra note 41, at 509. 
90. See, e.g.,  FINAL REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 54, 
at 7 (“The accumulation of smaller attacks may, however, be relevant from the point of view 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
burden, and as noted earlier, there is no indication that North Korea views 
its missile launches as anything more than saber-rattling. Unless that changes, 
there is no plausible legal basis for Japan to ask the United States to help it 
do anything more than intercept a North Korean missile it fears might be 
armed. 
 
IV. INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE 
 
It is also possible that the United States could launch a BNS not in collective 
self-defense of Japan, but on the basis of its own individual right of self-
defense. Dunlap has made that argument,91 as have Reeves and Lawless.92 
 
A. Armed Attack 
 
The problem here is finding a North Korean armed attack—actual or po-
tential—that would justify the United States launching a BNS in self-defense. 
Scholars have identified two possibilities, but neither is convincing. 
The first, offered by Dunlap, is that North Korea’s missile launches into 
Japan’s territorial waters constitute an armed attack on the U.S. soldiers 
based in Japan. As he puts it, the United States “has more than 54,000 of its 
own reasons to unilaterally act in self-defense.”93 
There is no question that the use of force against the external manifes-
tations of a State, such as soldiers and military installations, can trigger the 
right of self-defense. Resolution 3314, for example, deems aggression “[a]n 
attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces . . . of 
another State.”94 But even if it is possible to view North Korea’s missile 
launches as an armed attack, that attack is directed at Japan, not at the United 
States, because there is no evidence that North Korea is trying to harm U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
of anticipatory self-defence insofar as these incidents might in some circumstances support 
the case for likelihood of an imminent attack.”). 
91. Dunlap, supra note 59 
In my view, if force is used against Japan that would otherwise permit an Article 51 re-
sponse, it is quite likely that it’s not necessary for the U.S. to wrestle with the intricacies of 
the law of collective self-defense, as there are plenty of American military assets—not to 
mention thousands of U.S. citizens—in Japan to defend. 
92. Reeves & Lawless, supra note 37 (“Even without another missile targeting Japan, 
the United States could arguably rely on its own Article 51 individual right of self-defense 
to justify a ‘bloody nose’ strike.”). 
93. Dunlap, supra note 59. 
94. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 422, annex, art. 3(d). 
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soldiers or damage U.S. military installations. Unintentionally causing harm 
to a State’s people or property is not enough to satisfy the hostile-intent re-
quirement; the attacking State must deliberately use force against the affected 
State.95 So, although North Korea would be internationally responsible for 
any damage a missile attack on Japan might accidentally cause the United 
States’ external manifestations, a forcible U.S. response would constitute an 
armed attack against North Korea and trigger North Korea’s own right of 
self-defense. 
The second possibility, defended by Reeves and Lawless, is that the to-
tality of North Korea’s nuclear activities indicates that it intends to eventually 
attack the United States, thus entitling the United States to defend itself now 
via a BNS: 
 
North Korea’s recent activities help support a pre-emptive self-defense ar-
gument. Despite extensive efforts by the international community, includ-
ing through diplomacy, negotiations, collaboration, and sanctions, North 
Korea continues to defiantly test powerful nuclear weapons and launch 
ballistic missiles. Furthermore, it has gone to great lengths to conceal its 
nuclear testing program by creating underground facilities and intricate 
tunnel systems. This behavior, coupled with North Korea’s pattern of ag-
gressive rhetoric and threats against the United States and other nations, 
makes a pre-emptive use of force seem more and more necessary.96 
 
This argument is neither factually nor legally convincing. To begin with, 
Kim Jong-un’s bluster notwithstanding, there is no evidence that North Ko-
rea would ever use a nuclear weapon against the United States. To the con-
trary, as noted earlier, scholars overwhelmingly agree that North Korea’s nu-
clear program is designed to deter attacks against it and to coerce other 
States, particularly North Korea’s regional neighbors, into adopting more 
favorable political and economic policies.97 
Even if North Korea did have offensive intentions toward the United 
States, that would still not justify the United States launching a BNS now. As 
Reeves and Lawless openly acknowledge, any such strike would be an act of 
pre-emptive self-defense, because a North Korean armed attack on the 
United States—particularly a nuclear one—cannot be said to be imminent, 
                                                                                                                      
95. See RUYS, supra note 41, at 160 (“The concept of ‘animus aggressionis’ is therefore best 
construed as requiring the deliberate use of armed force against another State or its external 
manifestations, or, in other words, a hostile intent.”). 
96. Reeves & Lawless, supra note 37. 
97. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
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“leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”98 Moreover, 
given that a BNS would not be a reaction to a previous North Korean attack, 
the United States could not even plausibly argue that the Caroline standard 
should be somewhat relaxed to take into account a series of previous North 
Korean armed attacks. 
Whatever uncertainty exists about the meaning of imminence, particu-
larly in U.S. practice,99 it is beyond doubt that “true” pre-emptive self-de-
fense is unlawful. Although the international community is deeply divided 
over many important jus ad bellum issues, the unlawfulness of pre-emptive 
self-defense is not one of them. Unsurprisingly, the 125 members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, those States most likely to be the targets of force, 
categorically reject any attempt to expand self-defense to include pre-emp-
tive situations.100 But it is not just weaker States in the Global South that 
reject this position: nearly all powerful States believe that pre-emptive self-
defense is unlawful, including the five permanent member States of the U.N. 
Security Council.101 Even the United States rejects pre-emptive self-defense, 
stating categorically in the Operational Law Handbook that force “employed to 
counter non-imminent threats . . . is illegal under international law.”102 It is 
not surprising, therefore, that States claim a right of pre-emptive self-defense 
only as a last resort, preferring instead to describe their uses of force, how-
ever unpersuasively, as reactions to imminent armed attacks.103 After all, the 
one unabashed invocation of pre-emptive self-defense, by Israel following 
                                                                                                                      
98. The Caroline standard, quoted in R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82, 92 (1938). Although the text of Article 
51 limits self-defense to armed attacks that have occurred or are ongoing, post-Charter State 
practice supports the idea that self-defense is permissible in response to imminent armed 
attacks. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 54, at 
13 (“[T]here would seem to be increasing support for the view that the right to self-defence 
does exist in relation to manifestly imminent attacks, narrowly construed.”); Zemanek, supra 
note 50, ¶ 4 (“On balance the majority opinion accepts nevertheless that a manifestly immi-
nent armed attack which is objectively verifiable, i.e., an attack in progress, falls within the 
meaning of Art. 51 UN Charter.”). 
99. See, e.g., Banks & Criddle, supra note 35, at 75 (noting that “[o]ver time, the U.S. 
government has endorsed an increasingly capacious definition of ‘imminence’, treating cred-
ible threats of future attacks as ‘imminent’ even if the nature and timing of the anticipated 
attacks are uncertain and, in significant respects, hypothetical”). 
100. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 170 (“The Non-Aligned Movement continues to argue 
that Article 51 ‘is restrictive and should not be re-written or re-interpreted.’”). 
101. See, e.g., Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2. 
102.  OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 7. 
103. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 170–71. 
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its 1981 attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq, was unanimously con-
demned by the Security Council without even a single abstention.104 
No dispassionate observer would deny that North Korea’s nuclear pro-
gram poses a serious threat to international peace and security. But that does 
not mean North Korea intends to attack either the U.S. homeland or the 
U.S.’s external manifestations, much less imminently. It is not possible to 
infer the intention to attack from the mere capacity to do so.105 Accordingly, 
even in light of numerous North Korean missile launches into Japan’s terri-
torial waters and through Japanese airspace, North Korea’s nuclear activities 
would not justify the United States launching a BNS against targets on North 
Korean territory. 
 
B. Proportionality 
 
Because there is no plausible basis for considering a North Korean missile 
launch into Japan’s territorial waters as an armed attack on the United States, 
the United States could not justify a BNS against North Korea on the basis 
of its individual right of self-defense. It is nevertheless worth considering 
what kind of BNS would be proportionate to a hypothetical North Korean 
armed attack against either the United States or Japan. The ICJ has repeat-
edly made clear that proportionality is an essential requirement of any self-
defensive act, although, as Christodoulidou and Chainoglou have noted, its 
approach to the principle “could be described as confusing, if not phobic, 
due to the Court’s reluctance to define or even analyse the dimensions of 
proportionality in jus ad bellum.”106 
Among the scholars who have written on the legality of a BNS, only 
Schmitt and Goodman have specifically addressed proportionality. Their po-
sition is quite restrictive: 
 
Proportionality would cap any defensive response at the level needed to 
compel North Korean [sic] to do so. The “limited” nature of the bloody 
nose strategy may sound positive in this regard, but if the targets of the 
strikes are nuclear-related facilities or other critical assets, the risk that the 
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situation would escalate, rather than diminish, would, as a matter of law, 
auger against acting in self-defense. Even without contemplating possible 
escalation, it is hard to see how a U.S. military strike on a nuclear facility 
would be proportionate to an unarmed projectile dropping in Japanese wa-
ters.107 
 
The analysis above supports Schmitt and Goodman’s position in terms of a 
single missile launched into Japan’s territorial waters. If the missile was un-
armed, the launch would not qualify as an armed attack, making any “defen-
sive” response an armed attack in its own right. If the missile was armed, 
although Japan would be entitled to defend itself and to ask the United States 
for assistance, the individual or collective response could not go beyond in-
terceptive self-defense without constituting an unlawful reprisal. 
The legality of a BNS changes, however, if we imagine—very counter-
factually—that the first missile, whether armed or unarmed, signals the im-
minent launch of a second armed missile against Japan or the United States. 
In that case, as noted earlier, there would be nothing disproportionate about 
the United States (acting individually or in collective self-defense of Japan) 
going beyond interceptive self-defense and eliminating North Korea’s ability 
to launch subsequent missiles. Indeed, it would not matter whether the im-
minent second attack would involve a nuclear or conventionally armed mis-
sile. Either way, eliminating North Korea’s offensive capacity would be pro-
portionate. As Ago wrote long ago, if a State 
 
suffers a series of successive and different acts of armed attack from an-
other State, the requirement of proportionality will certainly not mean that 
the victim State is not free to undertake a single armed action on a much 
larger scale in order to put an end to this escalating succession of attacks.108 
 
That said, an imminent second attack would not give the United States 
carte blanche to engage in a BNS—not even if it limited its choice of targets to 
legitimate military objectives. The BNS would be lawful self-defense only if 
it targeted the specific installations involved in the kind of attack that North 
Korea was threatening to launch immediately. It could not target military 
objectives that had no nexus to the imminent attack: 
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[T]he exercise of the right to self-defense must not be a mere motive for 
military sanctions, since otherwise the exercise of the right to self-defense 
would amount to nothing but hidden armed counter-measures, which . . .  
are illegal under international law. In particular, the actions allegedly taken 
in the exercise of the right to self-defense must, by their very nature, be 
able to diminish the military abilities of the aggressor and to induce the 
enemy not to continue its attack.109 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Although there is no question that North Korea’s nuclear testing and missile 
launches are deeply concerning, experts on both the left and the right agree 
that a BNS on North Korean territory would be both politically and militarily 
disastrous. That is reason enough to oppose any such strike. 
This article has provided an additional reason for opposition: namely, 
that a BNS would categorically violate the prohibition of the use of force, 
one of the most fundamental norms of international law.110 North Korea’s 
nuclear testing may violate its international obligations, but it does not 
amount to an armed attack on Japan or the United States. And although it is 
possible to imagine future missile launches that would permit the United 
States to engage in more than interceptive self-defense on behalf of Japan, 
there is no evidence that North Korea has any intention of actually attacking 
either Japan or the United States—particularly not with a nuclear-armed mis-
sile. The sooner the United States abandons any thought of launching a BNS 
against North Korea, therefore, the better. 
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